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"Good" Science Gone Bad:
How the Criminal Justice System Can Redress
the Impact of Flawed Forensics
JESSICA D. GABEL* AND MARGARET D. WILKINSON**
INTRODUCTION
"DNA Exonerates Man in Prison For 26 Years,' .... DNA Frees
Innocent Man,"' and "Wrongly Convicted Man Now Free Thanks to
DNA Evidence."3 These headlines celebrate justice done, and highlight
forensic science's ability to rectify wrongs. There is no question that
scientific developments, particularly in the area of DNA, have advanced
how criminal cases are investigated, prosecuted, and presented in court.
Overlooked in the wake of such acclaim, however, is the fact that
forensic science is far from infallible. While advances in DNA testing
have provided a more exacting tool with which to explore guilt and
innocence, scientific developments that call previously accepted forensic
techniques into question often escape attention. Headlines such as "More
Arson Convictions Challenged by Science,",4 "Bullet-Matching Science
Debunked," ' "Hair Evidence in Jogger Case Discredited,,6 and "Are
Innocent Imprisoned? Fingerprint Errors Found,"7 underscore problems
* Jessica D. Gabel is an associate at Covington & Burling LLP in San Francisco, California, and
an adjunct professor of forensic evidence at University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
** Margaret D. Wilkinson is an associate at Covington & Burling LLP in San Francisco. The
Authors would like to acknowledge the substantial research contributions of Amrita Ajmani, Jacqui
Trinh, Joel Frozena, and Pete Wilkinson.
i. DNA Exonerates Man in Prison For 26 Years, CBSNEWS.cOM, Jan. 3, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2oo8/oI/o3/national/ main366979i.shtml.
2. DNA Frees Innocent Man, KCTV5.coM (Kan.), Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.kctv5.com/news/
1500773 i/detail.html.
3. Wrongly Convicted Man Now Free Thanks to DNA Evidence, WSBTV.coM (Atlanta), Nov.
12, 2007, http://www.wsbtv.com/news/14575783/detail.html.
4. Maurice Possley, More Arson Convictions Challenged by Science, CH. TRIB., Oct. 18, 2006, at
As.
5. John Solomon, Bullet-Matching Science Debunked, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2007, at Ai.
6. Jim Dwyer & Susan Saulny, Hair Evidence in Jogger Case Discredited, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2002, at Ai.
7. Rene Stutzman, Are Innocent Imprisoned? Fingerprint Errors Found, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
May 4, 2007, at At.
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with forensic science that are largely ignored and unchecked.
Forensic science is a vital component of the criminal justice system.
Undoubtedly, thousands of guilty defendants have been convicted with
the help of forensic evidence. Nonetheless, at the time of this writing,
the Innocence Project 9 estimates that forensic evidence with little to no
probative value caused or contributed to a wrongful conviction in at least
8o of the 217 DNA exoneration cases the Project has identified.' ° Many
forensic techniques, such as hair and fiber analysis, toolmark
comparisons, and fingerprint analysis, rely upon a simple "match game,"
whereby a forensic analyst compares a known sample to a questioned
sample and makes the highly subjective determination that the two
samples originated from the same source. Although lacking a true
scientific foundation, this Sesame Street Science" plays a prominent role
in many cases because of the easy availability of trace evidence, which is
easy to leave and easy to find at a crime scene. Other forensic fields,
including comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA) and arson
investigation, rely on assumptions that are "under-researched and
oversold."'2
In theory, scientific expert testimony must meet certain standards of
reliability before being admitted in court. In federal court and some state
courts, the Daubert standard governs the admissibility of such
testimony. 3 Under Daubert, a judge acts as a "gatekeeper" and may
admit scientific evidence as long as it is both "relevant" and "reliable.' ' 4
Other state courts have continued to follow the earlier Frye standard,
under which scientific evidence "must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" to
be admissible.'5 Despite these "rigors" of admissibility, courts have
8. See John Pickrell, Instant Expert: Forensic Science, NEWSCIENTIST.COM, Nov. TO, 2006,
http://technology.newscientist.com/channel/tech/forensic-science/dn io5oi.
9. The Innocence Project is a national litigation and public policy organization dedicated to
exonerating wrongly convicted people through the use of DNA testing and reforming the criminal
justice system. The Innocence Project, Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/
Mission-Statement.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
io. See The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Search the Profiles, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/know/Search-Profiles.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2008) (select "Unreliable/Limited
Science" from the "Contributing Cause" drop-down menu; then select "search") (listing eighty of the
217 post-conviction DNA exoneration cases in United States history); see also Brandon L. Garrett,
Judging Innocence, io8 COLuM. L. REV. 55, 81-95 (2008).
Is. A term that we coined after seeing a Sesame Street episode that played a match game titled
"One of these things is not like the others." See, e.g., YouTube.com, Sesame Street-One of These
Things-Circles, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCIGhtoivlg&feature=related (last visited Apr.
20, 20o8).
12. Michael Saks & Jonathan Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification
Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 892-95 (2005).
13. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (993).
14. Id. at 597.
15. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d io4,
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routinely accepted much of the so-called science underlying forensic
testing with little, if any, inquiry. 6
A revolution may be imminent, however. In 2005, the FBI
discontinued its CBLA program, finding that "neither scientists nor
bullet manufacturers are able to definitively attest to the significance of
an association made between bullets in the course of a bullet lead
examination."' 7 The FBI Laboratory performed CBLA examinations for
decades, and the resulting evidence was used to convict many
defendants. 8 A cloud of doubt now hangs over cases involving CBLA,
and the discrediting of other widely used forensic techniques seems likely
to follow.'9
What can the criminal justice system do when "good" science goes
bad? This article provides an answer to that question in three parts. First,
this article looks at the inability of certain fields of forensic science to
produce reliable results. Second, it discusses problems with the current
methods of challenging convictions based on unreliable science. Finally,
it proposes a new framework to better enable prisoners to seek review of
such convictions. What this article does not do is propose ways to
prevent wrongful convictions in the future. We recognize that many
issues, including the standards governing the admissibility of forensic
evidence and internal problems in forensic laboratories, will need to be
addressed in order to protect innocent defendants from being convicted
in the first instance. We propose a way to confront faulty forensics
retrospectively, by providing an avenue to relief for the many current
prisoners who were convicted based on misleading scientific evidence.
I. FAULTY FORENSICS: WHERE SCIENCE MEETS GUESSWORK
The cases are many, but the differences are few. Whether it was a
142 (Cal. 2007).
16. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W. 3d 258, 263-64 (Ky. 1999).
17. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Laboratory Announces Discontinuation
of Bullet Lead Examinations (Sept. 1, 2005) [hereinafter FBI Press Release], http://www.fbi.gov/
pressrel/pressrelo5/bullet lead analysis.htm.
18. Id.; see also John Solomon, FBI's Forensic Test Full of Holes, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, at
As, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2oo7/1/17/ST2007rIi701983.
html?sid=ST2oo7I I 1701 983#.
19. In recent years, studies of certain forensic fields have demonstrated a lack of scientific
foundation in the testing methods, identified serious flaws, and questioned the continued use of such
techniques. See INNOCENCE PROJECT ARSON REVIEW COMM., REPORT ON THE PEER REVIEW OF THE
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF TEXAS v. WILLINGHAM AND TEXAS V. WILLING 40 (2006), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ArsonReviewReport.pdf ("The significant lack of
understanding of the behavior of fire ... can and does result in significant misinterpretations of fire
evidence, unreliable determinations, and serious miscarriages of justice with respect to the crime of
arson."); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING (Daniel L. Cork et al. eds., 2008) ("The
validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related
toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated.").
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bullet from the smoking gun or a fingerprint left on the glass, the
evidence (and the alleged science behind it) produced wrongful
convictions. Critics have attempted to shed light on the weaknesses in
forensic science, but a policy of willful blindness prevails. The examples
below are only a fraction of the larger problem, but should serve as a
reminder that innocence cannot be ignored.
A. UNLOADED SCIENCE: COMPARATIVE BULLET LEAD ANALYSIS
In essence, the validity of CBLA evidence rests on one premise: if
the chemical composition of two bullets is identical, then the bullets
came from the same box.2" The first step of CBLA is to test a bullet
recovered at a crime scene for trace amounts of the various metals used
to make lead bullets.2 The results of that test are then compared to the
chemical composition of bullets associated with a suspect.22 The
assumption underlying CBLA was that bullets made from the same batch
of lead would have the same chemical composition, 23 allowing an analyst
to conclude that a bullet was likely to come from only a particular box of
ammunition that was manufactured on a given date." However, as
research eventually established, there is no defensible basis for such a
conclusion.
The FBI first used CBLA after the assassination of John F.
Kennedy, as a means of matching bullet fragments to Lee Harvey
Oswald's gun.25 CBLA provided a convenient means of tying bullets to
suspects when the gun used to shoot a bullet was unavailable, foreclosing
the use of traditional ballistics testing. As a result, over the next forty
years, CBLA was used in many criminal investigations and offered as
"scientific evidence" in several trials.26 CBLA testimony offered by FBI
experts ranged from the relatively reserved (that two bullets were
"analytically indistinguishable") to the absurd (that two bullets "had
been made by the same manufacturer on the same day and at the same
hour") 7 Courts regularly admitted CBLA evidence along all parts of this
spectrum, and allowed experts to present such evidence as scientifically
reliable.28
20. See Mark Hansen, Bulletproof: Can We Really Say Where a Particular Bullet Came from?, 9o
A.B.A. J. , Sept. 2o04, at 58, 58-6o (2004).
21. Id. at6i.
22. Id.
23. Solomon, supra note is.
24. See Hansen, supra note 20, at 62.
25. Paul Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs,
86 N.C. L. Rev. 163, 198 (2oo7).
26. See generally William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis: A Case Study in Flawed
Forensics, CHAMPION MAG., July 2004, at 12.
27. Hansen, supra note 20, at 61-62.
28. See, e.g., Ragland v. Commonwealth, 2oo4 WL 2623926, at *12 (Sup. Ct. Ky. 2004).
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Eventually, a collection of critical literature, poor press, and
successful challenges to CBLA's admissibility in court brought potential
problems with CBLA to light.29 The hullabaloo spurred the FBI to fund a
study into the reliability of trace metal analyses for the purpose of
"matching" suspect bullets to crime scene bullets. In 2004, the National
Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences released
its report ("NRC Report"), which concluded that "variations in the
manufacturing process rendered the FBI's testimony about the science
'unreliable and potentially misleading,"' and that CBLA testimony
"should be considered 'misleading under the federal rules of evidence."'30
As a result, the FBI abandoned CBLA in 2005."' After the NRC Report,
some prisoners have been successful in overturning convictions based on
CBLA. For example, in April 2006, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
ordered a new trial for Gemar Clemons, who was convicted of murder
and robbery based on CBLA evidence.32 The court found that CBLA
evidence "is not generally accepted within the scientific community as
valid and reliable" and should not have been admitted at trial.33
Since the FBI Laboratory was the only forensic laboratory that
conducted CBLA routinely, the FBI's decision to stop performing CBLA
has effectively halted the technique's use in criminal cases.34 Although
29. See Simon Cole et al., A Retail Sampling Approach to Assess Impact of Geographic
Concentrations on Probative Value of Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis, 4 LAW PROBABILrrY & RISK
199, 200 (2005) (citing critical coverage of CBLA).
30. Solomon, supra note 18.
31. Id. Oddly, the NRC Report was not the first to flag the possibility of errors in CBLA. In i991,
an FBI study ultimately determined that CBLA was "a 'useful forensic tool' that produced 'accurate'
and 'reproducible' matches," but noted two problem areas: first, that bullets packaged fifteen months
apart-a span with a built in presumption of separate batches of lead-had an identical composition;
second, the i99I study found that bullets from a single box contained different lead composition. Id.
Of course, this study did nothing to undercut the FBI's testament that the bullet manufacturing
process produced unique (and identifiable) batches of lead.
32. Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1070, IO79 (Md. 20o6).
33. Id. at to7o. Clemons was arrested and charged with possession of an unregistered handgun
and possession of ammunition after an accident involving a car in which he was a passenger. Id. at
io62. The gun was consistent with the weapon used to murder a man two days earlier, and a witness to
that shooting picked Clemons out of a photographic array. Id. Over the defense's objection, the
prosecution offered the testimony of Charles A. Peters, an FBI forensic chemist, as an expert on
CBLA. Id. at io64-65. Peters testified that CBLA was capable of determining that two bullets "were
manufactured or ... were likely manufactured in the same pot of lead at a bullet manufacturer," and
that the bullets at issue in the case were "analytically indistinguishable" and were consistent with
having come from the same source. Id. at 1o65, io67-68. A jury convicted Clemons, and he was
sentenced to forty-two years in prison. Id. at lO7O. The Court of Appeals of Maryland found that
CBLA did not meet Maryland's Frye-Reed test that governs the admissibility of scientific evidence. Id.
at lO78. The court relied on several scientific studies questioning the value of CBLA, including the
National Research Council's report commissioned by the FBI. Id. at 1075-78. while Clemons's
conviction "was not entirely dependent upon" CBLA evidence, the court declared itself "unable to
declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict," and
ordered a new trial. Id. at 1079 (citation omitted).
34. Id. at io78.
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exact numbers are not clear, the FBI estimated in 2005 that it conducted
bullet lead examinations in approximately 2,500 cases submitted by
federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies, and that
courts in about 20% of those cases actually introduced the bullet lead
analysis at trial.3" At the time, however, the FBI did not address how, or
if, it would handle the many cases where CBLA evidence helped to
convict defendants.
In late 2007, the Washington Post and the CBS program, 6o Minutes,
published and televised a scathing investigative series that criticized not
only CBLA, but also the FBI's delayed termination of the program its
apparent disinterest in facilitating a review of cases in which CBLA
played a role. 6 Since the reports were published and aired on national
television, the FBI has committed itself to identifying all cases in which
bullet-lead matches contributed to a conviction, because "[it's the right
thing to do."37 This corrective action apparently will include a nationwide
review of all CBLA-related testimony and notification to prosecutors so
that the courts and defendants can be alerted 5 The FBI lab also plans to
create a system to monitor the accuracy of its scientific testimony. 9 It
remains to be seen whether the FBI's planned measures will be
successful in identifying those defendants convicted on the basis of
CBLA evidence. Regardless, wrongful convictions based on CBLA will
stand unless prisoners have an effective way of challenging them.
B. HAIR-RAISING SCIENCE: MICROSCOPIC HAIR EXAMINATION
Microscopic hair analysis has been employed since the nineteenth
century,' and techniques used today differ little from those in use at the
beginning of the twentieth century.4 Microscopic hair analysis consists of
comparing the microscopic characteristics of hairs recovered at a crime
35. FBI Press Release, supra note 17.
36. Solomon, supra note i8.
37. Id. At the time of this writing, the Authors contacted the FBI to inquire about the status of
the case review. Calls for information and/or comment were not returned. There seems to be a
systemic policy of inaction. According to the Washington Post, the FBI initially believed that the
public release of the 2004 National Academy of Sciences report and the subsequent termination of
CBLA generated enough publicity to provide defendants and their attorneys plenty of opportunities
to lodge appeals. Id. A lawsuit brought in 2006 by Frederick Whitehurst, a former FBI agent who
worked in an FBI laboratory, and his Forensic Justice Project has attempted to gain access to a list of
the bullet lead cases under the Freedom of Information Act. See Forensic Justice Project v. Federal
Bureau of Investigation, No. i:2oo6-cv-otooi (D.D.C. filed May 31, 2006). Little progress has been
made in that case.
38. Solomon, supra note I8.
39. Id.
4o . BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT
RIGHT 2o8 (New American Library 2003).
41. Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis:
Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 227, 235
(1996).
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scene with suspect hairs. 2 Analysts seek to associate color, texture,
pigment, and other identifiers. In theory, if a match is obtained, such
evidence provides the missing link between the defendant and the
crime.43
Throughout its history, microscopic hair comparison has been a
forensic technique that has little relevance outside of a criminal
investigation.' As a result, it, as well as many other forensic fields based
on match identification, receives little attention from the scientific world
at large. 5 This limited exposure to anything resembling peer review,
proficiency testing, and error ratings would be enough to render the
technique unreliable in most scientific fields. Indeed, a match between
hairs is not based on any scientific test or experiment. Rather, a match is
the product of simple "eyeballing." Hair microscopy is not accompanied
by empirical data that exhibits any population frequencies of hair
consistencies.46 Neither statistics nor experiments have demonstrated an
unqualified uniqueness to human hair. In fact, hair from the same person
may vary greatly whereas hair from two unrelated individuals may be
very similar.47 Thus, the nature of hair microscopy makes it vulnerable to
high error rates and uneven application.4
Nevertheless, the use of hair analysis in the most intense and
delicate of settings-the determination of guilt or innocence-persists. 9
Many courts still admit such evidence as a matter of form without a
Daubert-like hearing." In 2005, a California appellate court held that no
Kelly/Frye hearing, the state equivalent of a Daubert hearing, was
42. Id. at 229.
43. See John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale of
Forensic Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 29:37 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2007-2008 ed.).
44. Stafford Smith & Goodman, supra note 41, at 233.
45- Id.
46. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1555 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
47. See Thornton & Peterson, supra note 43, at 48.
48. See id. at 49.
49. See People v. Renteria, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11995, at *186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(listing cases).
50. See id. In McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289, 1289 (Ind. 1997), the Indiana Supreme Court
overturned a lower appellate court decision that had found microscopic hair analysis to be unreliable.
The trial judge did not engage in a Daubert analysis of the hair evidence, a failure that led the
intermediate appellate court to exclude the evidence. See id. at 1289-9o. The Indiana Supreme Court
reversed and determined that the trial court "exercised appropriate discretion as to the reliability of
the proffered hair comparison analysis." Id. at 1292. The Indiana Supreme Court noted that
"[i]nherent in any reliability analysis is the understanding that, as the scientific principles become
more advanced and complex, the foundation required to establish reliability will necessarily become
more advanced and complex as well." Id. No complex foundation was required, however, and the
court condoned skipping that pesky Daubert analysis because "the evidence at issue was more a
matter of the observations of persons with specialized knowledge than a matter of scientific
principles." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If such evidence is merely a matter of observation,
then it would appear that any child past preschool could be trained to make specialized matches.
May 2008]
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required for the admission of hair microscopy evidence.' The court
noted that
"the potential rate of error of the technique is very low.... It is true
that hair comparisons, as do all other sciences, depend on the judgment
and experience of the examiner; but hair examiners are scientists and
not simply technicians. That is why they can reliably make the




Other courts have followed a similar model of routine, unchecked
admission of such evidence, glossing over the lack of real science to
support the validity of hair microscopy. In fact, many courts take judicial
notice of microscopic hair analysis and transfer the burden of proving the
unreliability of such evidence to a defendant. 3
Hair analysis has unquestionably produced wrongful convictions. A
study of the first 200 prisoners exonerated by DNA evidence found that
forty-three (nearly 22%) had been wrongly convicted largely on the
strength of hair follicles found at the crime scenes. 4 For example, in
December 2003, Oklahoma freed Calvin Scott after DNA testing proved
that he was not the perpetrator of a rape for which he served twenty
years.5 Hair analysis had played a crucial role in his conviction.6 Because
evidence continues to mount that hair analysis is unreliable, it is crucial
51. Renteria, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11995, at *187. The court went on to quote other
cases and explain its reasoning that "the principles and procedures underlying hair and fiber evidence
are overwhelmingly accepted and reliable," because "'[f]orensic examinations of human hairs have
been performed for years."' Id. at *187-88 (quoting Houck et al., Locard Exchange: The Science of
Forensic Hair Comparisons and the Admissibility of Hair Comparison Evidence: Frye and Daubert
Considered, MODERN MICROSCOPY J., Mar. 2, 2004, at 9, available at http://www.modernmicroscopy.com
/main.asp?article=36).
52. Renteria, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11995, at *t87 (citing Houck et al., supra note 51.).
53. See e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 262-63 (Ky. 1999) (listing cases where
hair microscopy was judicially noticed; requiring defendant to "introduce any evidence to prove the
unreliability of hair analysis by microscopic comparison"; and finding that the prosecution had no
"obligation to introduce affirmative evidence to prove its reliability, but could rely entirely on the
judicially noticed fact" of the reliability of microscopic hair analysis).
54. Garrett, supra note so, at 81.
55. The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Calvin Lee Scott, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/258.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
56. See id.; see also Ron Humphrey, Coming to Grips with Innocence, http://www.pfm.org/
article.asp?ID=i389 (last visited Apr. 20, 20o8). The rape victim was unable to identify her attacker.
The Innocence Project, supra note 55; Humphrey, supra. More than four months after the attack,
police received an anonymous tip that Scott, who was in jail for a shoplifting conviction, was
responsible. See The Innocence Project, supra note 55; Humphrey, supra. Scott voluntarily provided
hair samples to police. The Innocence Project, supra note 55. While prosecutors offered Scott several
plea bargains, he steadfastly maintained his innocence. Humphrey, supra. At trial, a state criminologist
testified that Scott's hairs were consistent with hair found at the scene of the crime, and he was
convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. See The Innocence Project, supra note 55;
Humphrey, supra. After Scott had served twenty years, he obtained DNA testing of physical evidence
that established that another man, already in prison for another rape, had committed the crime. See
The Innocence Project, supra note 55; Humphrey, supra.
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that defendants have a mechanism by which to challenge convictions
based on hair analysis.
C. SMUDGED SCIENCE: FINGERPRINT EXAMINATION
Fingerprint identification involves a comparison of questioned
friction skin ridge impressions from fingers (or palms) left at a crime
scene to known fingerprints. If an examiner determines that there are
enough common points between the two prints, the conclusion is that the
questioned print definitively belongs to the suspect. 7 Such an absolute
identification rests on a premise ingrained in our minds since childhood,
and prevalent for more than a century: no two fingerprints are alike. In
fact, there are three basic assumptions on which fingerprint identification
depends:
i.... [N]o two fingers have ever been found to possess identical ridge
characteristics.
2. A fingerprint will remain unchanged during a person's lifetime.
3. Fingerprints will have general ridge characteristics that permit them
to be systematically classified and examined with great efficiency and
efficacy."
Since fingerprint evidence has been venerated for so long, its
admissibility is simply a given. There is no actual evidence, however, that
an individual's fingerprints are unique to all others in the world.59
Instead, like hair analysis, fingerprint analysis is another exercise in an
examiner's subjective attempt to connect the dots. Logic might dictate
that fingerprint evidence must fall short of admissibility, but its
longstanding acceptance (the cornerstone of admissibility under Frye)
reveals otherwise.
In recent years, lawyers have launched significant challenges to
fingerprint identification. In 2004, there was a great deal of publicity
about the fingerprint analysis error that put Brandon Mayfield in jail as a
suspect in the Madrid train bombings.6 1 In January of 2004-only months
57. See DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, RIDGEOLOGY: MODERN EVALUATIVE FRICTION RIDGE IDENTIFICATION
34-35 (i991), available at http://onin.com/fp/ridgeology.pdf.
58. TERRENCE F. KIELY, FORENSIC EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 349 (2d ed. 2006).
59. See United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848,852 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("In roughly ioo years
since fingerprints have been used for identification purposes, no one has managed to falsify the claim
of uniqueness by showing that fingers of two persons had identical fingerprints.").
60. Simon A. Cole, Does "Yes" Really Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close Debate on the
Admissibility of Fingerprint Testimony, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 449, 450 (2005).
61. Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings To
Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 189, 225-33(2004).
62. See, e.g., Steven T. Wax & Christopher J. Schatz, A Multitude of Errors: The Brandon
Mayfield Case, CHAMPION MAG., Sept./Oct. 2004, at 6, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
0909 03 73de4fa9c7d85256f3300551e42?opendocument; Press Release, Statement on Brandon Mayfield
Case (May 24, 2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrelo4/mayfieldo524o4.htm; FBI
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before the Mayfield incident-Stephan Cowans was released after
serving more than six years of a thirty- to forty-five-year sentence for
shooting and wounding a police officer. 3 Cowans had been convicted
solely on fingerprint and eyewitness evidence, but post-conviction DNA
testing showed that Cowans was not the perpetrator. 4 The Boston Police
Department then admitted that the fingerprint evidence was erroneous,
making Cowans the first person convicted by fingerprint evidence and
exonerated by DNA evidence.
6s
In 2006, criminologist Simon A. Cole released an extensive study
that exposed not only the existence of fingerprint errors, but also the
harsh reality that as many as one thousand incorrect fingerprint
"matches" could be made each year in the United States.66 The Cole
study is the first to examine the twenty-two known cases of fingerprint
Apologizes to Lawyer Held in Madrid Bombings: Man Feels He Was Singled Out Because He's
Muslim, MSNBC.coM, May 25, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5o53oo7; see also Mayfield v.
United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007). According to the lawsuit filed by Mayfield and his
family, after the March ii, 2004, commuter train bombings, Spanish authorities discovered a bag of
detonating devices and obtained a fingerprint impression from the bag. Id. at 1026-27. The FBI
initially matched the fingerprints to Mayfield ("too% verified"). Id. at lO28. The FBI then sent
Mayfield's prints to the Spanish authorities, who challenged the FBI's purported match. Id. Moreover,
the Spanish authorities had already identified other suspects who were not linked to anyone in the
United States. Id. at 1029. The FBI disregarded the Spanish authorities' position, and arrested
Mayfield on May 6, 2004. Id. The Spanish authorities continued to doubt that Mayfield left the
fingerprint on the bag, and weeks later announced that the fingerprints actually belonged to an
Algerian national, Ouhnane Daoud. Mayfield was released on May 20, 2004, and the case was
dismissed five days later. Id. During Mayfield's civil suit, the FBI's records showed that Mayfield's
fingerprint was but only one of twenty "similar" prints to the ones that were retrieved from Madrid.
Id. at 1027. The FBI investigated each of the twenty individuals, and Mayfield's name quickly rose to
the top of the list, because, as alleged by the lawsuit, of his Muslim background (his wife is an Egyptian
national and he converted not long after their marriage). See id.; Hal Bernton & David Heath,
Portland Man Innocent in Madrid Train Bombing, Family Says, SEATTLE TIMES, May 8, 2004,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2001923229-mayfieldo8m.html. The court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Mayfield family. Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
63. See David Dobbs, DNA's Accuracy Puts Traditional Forensics on Trial, POPULAR MECHANICS
July 2006, at 78, available at http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military-law13oo536.html.
64. Id.
65. Id. As detailed in a Popular Mechanics expose, during a police chase on foot, officer Gregory
Gallagher chased a suspicious man down an alley and over a fence. On the other side of the fence,
Gallagher and the suspect struggled, and the suspect took control of the officer's handgun and opened
fire. One round hit Gallagher in the leg. The assailant then fled the scene, eventually finding his way
into a house where he demanded a glass of water from the occupants. Fingerprint experts matched the
print left on the glass of water to Stephan Cowans, a Boston local with a warrant out on him for
larceny. Gallagher and another witness identified Cowans. Coupled with two analysts from Boston's
fingerprint lab who testified that the fingerprints undeniably belonged to Cowan, the conviction was
foolproof. In 2004, analysis of DNA left on the glass, and on a baseball cap and sweatshirt discarded
by the suspect, proved Cowans was innocent. As a result, the Boston police commissioner closed the
fingerprint lab for almost two years. Id.; see also Jonathan Saltzman & Mac Daniel, Man Freed in 1997
Shooting of Officer: Judge Gives Ruling After Fingerprint Revelation, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2004, at
At.
66. Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95
J. Ciui. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1017 (2005).
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mistakes. The cases, which date from 192o, are devastating to the
contention that fingerprint identification is "infallible." While twenty-
two errors in a century of fingerprint evidence may seem like a small
number, it is important to remember that, as Cole points out, these
errors are just the "proverbial iceberg of actual cases of fingerprint
misattribution."' The errors in these cases have only come to light
because they were discovered by chance and revealed publicly. 6 It is
impossible to say how many other cases exist in which erroneous
fingerprint matches have contributed to wrongful convictions.
Notwithstanding the zero-error rate marketed by print examiners,
the Cole study notes that proficiency tests conducted since 1983 show an
aggregate error rate of o.8%.69 Although this figure may appear trivial,
labs process fingerprints in thousands of cases each year. For example in
2002, the year of the Cole study, United States crime laboratories
processed 238,135 requests for latent print analysis. An error rate of
o.8% translates to 1,905 fingerprint mistakes in that year alone." Such a
statistic is unacceptable.
In the face of this error rate, fingerprint examiners assert that the
checks incorporated into the system of print analysis should safeguard
against a wrongful identification (and, hence, a wrongful conviction).7
These ostensible safeguards include: (i) having additional examiners
verify print identifications; (2) certifying only competent examiners; (3)
requiring a high number of matching points in the ridges before declaring
the print a match;7" and (4) allowing a defendant to have independent
experts examine the prints.73 As evidenced by the Cole study, however,
each of these safeguards has failed. In fact, in four of the Cole study cases
(including Cowans and Mayfield), independent experts corroborated the
disputed prints, finding matches where there were none.714 This so-called
67. Id. at 991.
68. Id.
69. Id. at IO3O. This aggregate includes the anomalous year of 1995 when the error rate soared to
4.4%. Id.
70. ld. at 1034.
71. Id. at 1022-25.
72. The word "high" in this calculus is a bit of a misnomer. In comparing ridge characteristics, any
given fingerprint has approximately 15o available points for comparison. See Kiely, supra note 58, at
348. All print impressions are, in effect, only partial impressions of the actual print, since they do not
exhibit all I5O points. As a foundation for an impression to be deemed a "match" to the print, courts in
the United States generally require six to eight points, where other nations require fourteen or more.
Id. In the Cole study, twelve of the twenty-two cases he examined had known numbers of comparison
points. Of those twelve cases, six had at least sixteen points for comparison, and all twelve cases had at
least eleven points of comparison. Sixteen is thought to be a "very exacting standard." Cole, supra
note 66, at 1024-25.
73. Cole, supra note 66, at 1022-25.
74. Id. at 1025.
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science must not be as "infallible" as advertised.75
Despite the recent questions that have arisen about fingerprint
identification, it is regular practice for a fingerprint technician to testify
that the error rate is zero. 6 This begs the question, how would the
technician know that the error rate is zero? Indeed, before the Mayfield
debacle, examiners were loath to adopt any sort of blind analysis to test
proficiency and error rates.77
Simon Cole is correct: neither a fingerprint examiner nor the
criminal justice system can distinguish "between correct latent print
attributions and misattributions." ' s A mistaken match-an "imposter"-
looks the same as the true match, and fingerprint analysis simply cannot
differentiate between the two.79 No two fingerprints are exactly alike, as
to each and every point of the possible 150 points. However, multiple
people may have a certain number of ridge characteristics in common,
and thus the axiom that "no two fingerprints are alike" is defied in
practice. Until this principle-that different fingerprints can appear the
same-can be clearly articulated in court, fingerprint evidence should be
removed as a cornerstone of forensic science. Justice requires "a
methodically reliable analysis," ' and despite the reluctance of courts to
acknowledge fault in this age-old forensic device the fact remains that
there are innocent people whose convictions were sealed with a print."
75. The tide, however, may be changing. In late 2007, a Baltimore judge in a death penalty case
ruled that an analysis linking the defendant's fingerprints to prints found on a stolen car was
inadmissible because the error rate in fingerprint comparison is unknown. Stephen Kiehl, Defender
Spotlights Faulty Forensics, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 5, 2007, at IA, available at http://www.baltimore
sun.com/news/local/baltimore-county/bal-te.md.kento5novo5,o,7o8o554.story?page= i.
76. Cole, supra note 66, at 990.
77. Id. at 994. Blind testing is where the examiner is shielded from case information and does not
know that the questioned print is meant to match the crime scene print. In some blind tests, the
examiner is given a set of prints from which to find a match, if any. See, e.g., Michele Triplett's
Fingerprint Dictionary, http://www.fprints.nwlean.net/d.htm (follow "B" hyperlink; scroll down to
"Blind Testing" entry) (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). A double blind test would be the best approach, but
it is even less doubtful that the examiner and fingerprint lab employ a method of double blind testing
and verification. Double blind testing is a scientific method whereby the examiner does not know that
he or she is part of the test. See id. (follow "D" hyperlink; scroll down to "Double Blind Testing"
entry). It tests the reliability and reproducibility of a conclusion. Double blind verification adds
another layer where the same information is given to other examiners to independently analyze the
prints without the influence of the first examiner's conclusions. Id. Without a true scientific method to
determine error rates-or to prove the accepted lack thereof-fingerprint identification remains a
pseudoscience.
78. Cole, supra note 66, at 1057.
79. Id.
8o. New Hampshire v. Langill, No. o5-S-I 129, slip op. at 15 (N.H. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2007).
81. Id. (excluding fingerprint evidence that lacked, among other things, blind testing and
documented methodology). Although some courts have considered challenges to fingerprint evidence,
few actually excluded it. Perhaps the best example is the Llera Plaza case. United States v. Llera Plaza,
18I F. Supp. 2d 414 (E.D. Pa. 2002). In Llera Plaza, Judge Pollak initially ruled that the government
would be able to present expert fingerprint testimony that: (i) described how any latent and rolled
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Unfortunately, current postconviction procedures are ill-equipped to
cope with these cases.
II. THE CURRENT MODEL: FRACTURED AND INEFFECTIVE APPROACHES
TO INNOCENCE
The preceding section discussed how conjecture and imagination,
masquerading as science, failed innocent people. Of the first 2oo DNA
exoneration cases, 113 involved introduction of faulty forensic evidence."
It is impossible to know how many other innocent people have been
convicted based on the same faulty forensic evidence where DNA is not
available to exonerate them. Moreover, the preceding overview only
identified a handful of problematic forensic fields. There are other
forensic specialties (toolmarks, arson investigation, and handwriting to
name a few) that are equally grounded in untested and unreliable
"science."
While DNA has become the new arbiter of guilt and innocence, it
has also negatively affected prisoners who cannot take advantage of such
compelling evidence. States have enacted statutes that provide for post-
conviction DNA testing in cases of alleged innocence. Lost in the shuffle,
however, is DNA's other implication: that many fields of forensic
science, despite widespread acceptance, frequently yield incorrect results.
This section discusses the current framework for how a factually innocent
person can challenge faulty forensics if DNA evidence is not available.
As this section makes clear, the current postconviction framework
(absent exculpatory DNA evidence) is ineffective to handle cases
involving unreliable science.
A. AVAILABLE METHODS OF SEEKING DIRECT AND COLLATERAL REVIEW OF
CONVICTIONS
i. Direct Review
A motion for a new trial is the primary form of direct review by
which prisoners can seek to overturn their convictions on the basis of
newly discovered evidence. All federal and state jurisdictions provide a
mechanism by which prisoners can move for a new trial. The rules of
most jurisdictions explicitly recognize newly discovered evidence as a
prints at issue in this case were obtained; (2) identified such fingerprints and any necessary
magnifications for the jury; and (3) pointed out any observed similarities and differences between a
particular latent print and a particular rolled print. Id. Judge Pollak, however, restricted the
government from presenting testimony that a latent print matched the rolled print of a particular
person. Id. Only two months later (and after much fanfare and press), Judge Pollak retreated from his
initial ruling and allowed in the match testimony. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549,
576 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
82. Garrett, supra note io, at 8I.
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basis for such a motion.83
In most jurisdictions, prisoners have only three years or less from a
particular event-usually the verdict or finding of guilty, entry of
judgment, or sentencing 84 to request a new trial based on new evidence
(though many jurisdictions extend this time limit if newly discovered
evidence is the basis for the motiong8). The time limits vary widely among
jurisdictions, ranging from three years in federal court, the District of
Columbia, and four states, 86 to a month or less in fifteen states.87 In four
other states, a prisoner may potentially bring a new trial motion on the
basis of newly discovered evidence at any time, subject to the court's
discretionY' Only eight states allow a prisoner to seek a new trial at any
time."'
83. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181(8) (West 2007). The exceptions are Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ARK. R. CRIM. PROC. 33.3; FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.590; GA.
CODE. ANN. §§ 5-5-40, 5-5-41 (2007); HAW. R. PENAL PROC. 33; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-1 (2008);
MASS. R. CRIM. PROC. 30; MICH. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 6.43 I; Mo. R. CRIM. PROC. 29.1 1; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-16-702 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526:1 (20o7); TENN. R. CRIM. PROC. 33; TEX. R. App. PROC.
21.2; UTAH R. CRIM. PROC. 24; VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:15; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 809.30 (West 2006).
84. See, e.g., ARK. R. CRIM. PROC. 3 3 .3(b) (entry of judgment); OHIO R. CRIM. PROC. 33 (b)
(verdict); TENN. R. CRIM. PROC. 33(b) (sentencing).
85. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. Proc. 33 (increasing time from 5 days to 18o days); DEL. R. CRIM.
PROC. 61(l)(4) (increasing time from fifteen days to sixty days); Mo. R. PRAC. & PROC. 4-331 (increasing
time from ten days to one year); N.M. R. CluM. PROC. 5-614 (increasing time from ten days to two
years); W.V. R. CRIM. PROC. 33 (removing ten day limit).
86. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(I); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-582 (2007); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC.
33; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2103(4) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526:4 (2005); N.D. R. CRIM. PROC.
33(b)(I).
87. ALA. CODE § 15-I7-5(a) (2007) (thirty days); ARK. R. CRIM. PROC. 33.3(b) (thirty days); FLA. R.
CRIM. PROC. 3.590(a) (ten days); HAW. R. PENAL PROC. 33 (ten days); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/II6-1(b)
(2oo8) (thirty days); IND. R. CRIM. PROC. 16(A) (thirty days); MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 26.04 subdiv. I1(3)
(fifteen days); Miss. UNIF. R. CIR. & COUNTY CT. PRAC. 10.O5 (ten days); Mo. R. CRIM. PROC. 29.11
(fifteen to twenty-five days); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-16-702(2) (2007) (thirty days); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-29-I (2007) (ten days); TENN. R. CRIM. PROC. 33(b) (thirty days); TEX. R. App. PROC.
21.4(a) (thirty days); UTAH R. CRIM. PROC. 24(c) (ten days); VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A:I5(b) (twenty-one days
for motion to set aside verdict); WIS. STAT. § 809.30(2)(b) (2006) (twenty days). In Hawaii and Utah, a
court may extend the ten-day limit indefinitely, but may only do so within that ten day period. See
HAW. R. PENAL PROC. 33; UTAH R. CRIM. PROC. 24(c). In California, a motion for a new trial must be
made before judgment is entered. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1182 (West 2007).
88. GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 5-5-40(a), 5-5-41(a) (2007) (motion for new trial must be made within
thirty days of judgment "except in extraordinary cases"); Ky. R. CRIM. PROC. io.o6 (motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence must be made within one year of judgment "or at a later time
if the court for good cause so permits"); OHIO R. CPIM. PROC. 33(B) (motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence must be made within 12o days of judgment unless "it is made to appear by
clear and convincing proof that the prisoner was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the
evidence upon which he [or she] must rely"); OR. R. CIv. PROC. 64 (F) (motion for new trial must be
made within ten days of judgment "or such further time as the court may allow").
89. COLO. R. CRIM. PROC. 33(c) (motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence must be
filed "as soon after entry of judgment as the facts supporting it become known to the defendant");
MAss. R. CRIM. PROC. 3 o(b) (no time limit for new trial motions); N.J. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.20-2 (no time
limit for new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10.1
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In addition to the often limited amount of time available to seek a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a prisoner may only make
such a motion if several other requirements are met. For example, the
evidence must not have been discoverable by "reasonable diligence"
prior to the time of trial.' In addition, newly discovered evidence may
only be sufficient to require a new trial if a prisoner can show that the
evidence, if available at the time of trial, would have changed the
verdict.9 Many jurisdictions do not allow new trials based on new
evidence where that evidence would be used only for impeachment or is
cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial." As a result, the
requirements a prisoner must meet to get a new trial all but ensure that
an innocent person in many jurisdictions will not be able to do so under
direct review procedures.
2. Collateral Review
a. State Postconviction Procedures
Every state has at least one postconviction remedy by which a
prisoner can challenge the validity of his or her conviction after direct
approaches have failed. These postconviction remedies may or may not
be available to a prisoner who claims that newly discovered evidence
establishes his or her innocence. In some states, a free-standing, or
"bare" claim of innocence, which is a claim of innocence that is not
accompanied by a constitutional claim,93 cannot be the basis for
postconviction relief.' Even where such a claim is cognizable, the
standards a prisoner must meet to establish entitlement to relief can be
(McKinney 2005) (no time limit for motions to vacate judgment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(c)
(2007) (new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence must be filed "within a reasonable time
of its discovery"); 234 PA. CODE § 7 20(C) (2007) (new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence
must be filed "promptly after such discovery"); S.C. R. CRIM. PROC. 29 (new trial motion based on
newly discovered evidence must be filed "within a reasonable period of time after discovery of the
evidence"); W.V. R. CRIM. PROC. 33 (no time limit for new trial motions based on newly discovered
evidence).
90. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-17-5(a)(5) (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 118(8) (West 2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-2406(7) (2007); MD. RULE 4-33i(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2101(5) (2007); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 440.1O.I(s)(g) (McKinney 2005); OHIo R. CRIM. PROC. 33(A)(6); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 15-6-59(a)(4) (2007); WASH. SUPER. Cr. CRIM. R. 7.8(b)(2).
91. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 851(3) (2007); MISS. UNIF. R. CIR. & COUNTY. CT.
PROC. 10.05.3; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 44o.1o.I(i)(g) (McKinney 2005).
92. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 913 A.2d 1189, 1193-94 (Del. 2006); Hester v. State, 647 S.E.2d 60, 63
(Ga. 2007): Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, iO48 (Ind. 2007); Pippitt v. State, 737 N.W.2d 221,
226 (Minn. 2007); State v. Tester, 923 A.2d 622, 626 (Vt. 2007).
93. See Michael J. Muskat, Note, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the Aftermath of
Herrera v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution of Bare Innocence Claims Through
State Postconviction Remedies, 75 TEX. L. REV. 131, 133 (1996).
94. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 930.3 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.2i(A)(i)(a) (2oo8); Jackson v. State, 573 P.2d 637, 639 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); Barbee v. Warden
of Md. Penitentiary, i51 A.2d 167, I69 (Md. 1959).
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quite strict and nearly impossible to meet. 95
Each jurisdiction has particular procedural requirements that a
prisoner must satisfy to bring a petition for postconviction relief. In
several jurisdictions, there is no time limit on when a prisoner may apply
for such relief.96 In most others, however, a court may waive the time
limit only if the prisoner: (a) has a claim based on new evidence that,
with "due diligence" could not have been discovered in time to be
presented at trial ;9 (b) has filed a claim within a certain time after
discovery of the evidence; 98 (c) has a claim of actual innocence; 99 and/or
(d) can show that barring the petition on procedural grounds would be
unjust. '  Generally, second or successive petitions for postconviction
relief are not allowed.' °1 Nonetheless, a prisoner may be able to bring a
successive petition if he or she could not have raised the claim in a
previous petition.' °2
The various hurdles placed in postconviction procedures work
against the wrongly convicted. Their entitlement to counsel suffers from
similar disabilities. In several states, the appointment of counsel is up to
the discretion of the court or the state public defender. 3 Even where a
prisoner has the right to counsel in a postconviction proceeding, the
appointment of counsel usually does not occur until after the petition is
filed. Without counsel, prisoners must either resort to proceeding pro se,
or forego postconviction remedies altogether. The lack of counsel
diminishes--if not extinguishes-an innocent person's ability to
challenge his or her conviction.
95. For example, several jurisdictions require a prisoner to make a showing of actual innocence.
See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/122-1(2) (2008) (requiring that petitioner be sentenced to death and
evidence "establish[] a substantial basis to believe that the defendant is actually innocent" in order to
establish entitlement to relief based on newly discovered evidence); In re Weber, 523 P.2d 229, 243
(Cal. 1974) (requiring newly discovered evidence must "point[] unerringly to innocence," to warrant
habeas relief).
96. See, e.g., HAw. R. PENAL PROC. 40(a)(i); MASS. R. CRIM. PROC. 3o(a); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
i i-6(a) (2007); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 44o.o.i() (McKinney 2005).
97. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.850(b)(i); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9 5 4 5 (b)(i)(ii) (20O7); see
also N.J. R. 3:22-4 (excusing time limit for claims that "could not reasonably have been raised" in a
prior petition); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.510(3) (2005) (same).
98. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-52(b) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-102(2) (2005)
(requiring petition based on newly discovered evidence be filed within a year of when evidence was or
could have been discovered); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(c) (2007) (same).
99. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § I2.72.020(b)(2) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(b)(2) (2007).
IOO. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6o-157(f)(2) (2OO6); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-Io7(3) (2oo7).
loi. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-49o8 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2128(3) (2007);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-103(a) (2007).
102. See, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. PROC. 3 5 (c)( 3 )(VI); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-51 (2oo7); 22 OKLA. STAT.
tit. 15, § io86 (20o7); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, §§ 4(a)(I), (c), art. I1.oTI, § 5(a) (Vernon
2007).
103. See, e.g., IND. R. POST-CON. REM. i § 9(a) (public defender); MASS. R. CRIM. PROC. 30(c)(5)
(judge).
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b. Federal Postconviction Procedures
The disjointed patchwork of postconviction procedures is not unique
to state law. The federal system also establishes similar indefinite and
unreasonable requirements. State prisoners who have exhausted state
postconviction remedies and whose claims are not procedurally barred
may seek habeas relief from the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. '04
However, as in many states, federal courts do not recognize a
freestanding claim of actual innocence as a basis for relief. In Herrera v.
Collins, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that without an
accompanying claim of a constitutional violation, a bare claim of
innocence based on newly discovered evidence does not warrant federal
habeas relief for a state prisoner. io5 The Herrera majority assumed for the
sake of argument that a state prisoner sentenced to death may be entitled
to federal habeas relief where the prisoner makes "a truly persuasive
demonstration of actual innocence" and there is no way to pursue the
claim under state law.' 6 While the Supreme Court has subsequently
declined to decide whether the exception suggested in Herrera does in• I7 1o8
fact exist, most circuits have recognized it in post-Herrera cases.
Because the exception would apply in such a narrow set of hypothetical
circumstances, however, federal habeas relief is effectively unavailable to
prisoners convicted under state law who seek to advance bare claims of
innocence.
Federal prisoners who have unsuccessfully challenged their
convictions on direct appeal may petition for habeas relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, two
circuits have extended Herrera's rationale to petitions brought under
§ 2255, section 2254's counterpart for federal prisoners."° Considering
that the trend is for courts to extend Herrera's rationale to section 2255
petitions, federal prisoners with bare claims of innocence likely may only
104. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (20oo).
105. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,400-01 (1993).
iO6. Id. at 417.
107. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006).
xo8. See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 27-28 (ist Cir. 2007); Albrecht v. Horn, 485
F.3d 103, 121-24 (3d Cir. 2007); Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3 d 844, 854 (6th Cir. 2007); Davis v. Terry, 465
F.3d 1245, 1251 (iwth Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Cox v. Burger, 398 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2005);
Clayton v. Gibson, i99 F.3d 1162, 118o (Ioth Cir. 199o); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc); Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1993); Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758,
765-66 (4th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 68 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasizing
that Herrera did not hold such an exception exists); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 741 (5th Cir.
2000) (rejecting existence of such an exception).
to9. Conley v. United States, 323 F.3 d 7, 13-14 (ist Cir. 2003); United States v. Evans, 224 F.3d
670, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2000); Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 1993), overruled in part
on other grounds by Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503-04 (1993); see also Sims v. United




bring those claims in a motion for a new trial.
3. Clemency
Clemency is the "historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of
justice where judicial process has been exhausted."" Clemency is
available under federal law and the law of all fifty states."' The United
States Constitution vests the power to pardon in the President, and most
state constitutions similarly vest the power to pardon in governors.
Clemency is not without its own cast of procedural nightmares.
Most jurisdictions require a prisoner seeking clemency to have
exhausted all other possible avenues of relief."3 In addition, several
jurisdictions require that a prisoner have served a certain portion of his
or her sentence before he or she is eligible to apply for clemency."'4 If an
application for clemency is denied, the prisoner may have to wait a
certain amount of time before reapplying, or may be barred from
reapplying at all."5
While some jurisdictions permit the grant of a full pardon, including
the restoration of civil rights,' in other jurisdictions the commutation of
a sentence is the main remedy available to prisoners."' As a result, a
grant of clemency will not necessarily result in a prisoner's being released
immediately."' In some jurisdictions, the grant of clemency may be
revocable, subject to the grantee's compliance with certain conditions." 9
ilO. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 412.
I I I. Holly Schaffter, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 5oo Pound Gorilla in State Courts, 50
DRAKE L. REV. 695,724 (2002).
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I; see, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 21; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8(a);
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a); ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12; ME. CONST. art. V, § I1; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4;
OHIO CONST. art. III, § I1; VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; WiS. Co NsT. art. V, § 6. But cf., PA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 9(a) (allowing governor to grant clemency only upon recommendation of a Board of Pardons); S.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 14 (vesting only partial power to grant clemency in governor); TEX. CONST. art. IV,
§ I I (permitting governor to grant clemency only after a recommendation from the Board of Pardons).
113. See, e.g., New York State Division of Parole, Executive Clemency, http://parole.state.ny.us/
Clemency.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
114. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225(a) (2005); Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles,
Information and Instructions for New Clemency Form, http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/PDF/forr/
PardonClemencyInstructions.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2008); see also ALA. CODE § 15-22-28(e)
(requiring a unanimous vote to grant parole unless prisoner has served certain amount of time).
115. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §638.02 (2005); Illinois Prisoner Review Board, Guidelines for
Executive Clemency 1, http://www.state.il.us/prb/docs/exclemexg.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
116. See, e.g., Ark. Governor's Clemency Office, The Executive Clemency Process, at 3,
http://www.governor.arkansas.gov/pdf/clemency/o3o7executive-clemency-app.pdf (last visited Apr.
20, 2008); Mass. Parole Bd., Executive Clemency Overview, http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD
=eopshomepage&L-I&Lo=Home&sid=Eeops (follow "Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice"
hyperlink; then follow "Parole" hyperlink; then follow "Executive Clemency Unit" hyperlink; then
follow "Executive Clemency Unit Overview" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
117. See, e.g., Fla. Bd. of Executive Clemency, Rules of Executive Clemency, at 3,
https:llfpc.state.fl.us/PolicieslExecClemency/ROECo4o52oo7.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2oo8).
118. See, e.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE § 450.01(c).
i19. See, e.g., Morr. ADMIN. R. 20.25.9OLA(2) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 81o (2005); ALASKA
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Consequently, clemency is available in highly specialized circumstances
and even when granted may not provide adequate relief for innocent
prisoners.
B. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENTLY AVAILABLE METHODS OF RELIEF
As the foregoing overview suggests, a prisoner with a free-standing
claim of innocence based on the discrediting of a forensic technique faces
a litany of obstacles in seeking to overturn his or her conviction. The
passage of time is a particular problem: relief simply may be unavailable
after a certain amount of time has passed. Even if there are available
avenues for challenging a conviction, the high standards for establishing
exceptions to procedural bars and entitlement to relief may effectively
preclude a successful challenge.
i. Foreclosure of Claims by the Passage of Time
In several jurisdictions, the time for moving for a new trial is limited
and claims of innocence based on newly discovered evidence are not
cognizable in petitions for postconviction relief. For example, if three
years have passed since a federal prisoner's conviction, he or she may not
move for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.'20 In
addition, under Herrera v. Collins, he or she may not seek habeas relief
for a bare claim of innocence.'2 ' In Louisiana, a prisoner can only move
for a new trial on the basis of "new and material evidence" within a year
after the verdict or judgment,'22 and a claim of actual innocence is not a
cognizable ground for postconviction relief unless the claim rests on the
results of DNA testing.' 3 In other states, a prisoner with a claim of actual
innocence has an even shorter window of time to bring a claim of actual
innocence. For example, in Arkansas, a prisoner must move for a new
trial within thirty days after entry of judgment,' 4 and newly discovered
evidence is not a ground for postconviction relief.' 5 The overriding
theme is that time does not stop for innocence.
In addition to time constraints, jurisdictions impose substantive
criteria on prisoners seeking relief for claims of innocence that may
BD. OF PAROLE, EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN ALASKA: AN INFORMATIONAL BOOKLET FOR PROSPECTVE
APPLICANTS (2oo6), available at http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/Parole/clemencyhandbook.
pdf.
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 3 (b)(i).
121. 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (993).
122. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 851(3), 853 (2005).
123. Id. at art. 930.3.
124. ARK. R. CRIM. PROC. 33.3(b).
125. Chisum v. State, 625 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Ark. 1981). In Tennessee, a prisoner must move for a
new trial within thirty days after sentencing, and postconviction relief is only available for claims of
constitutional error, not claims based on newly discovered evidence of innocence. TENN. R. CRIM.
PROC. 33(b); see also Myers v. State, No. M2oo4 -o2411-CCA-MR3-PC, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
676, at *I I-*14 (June 29, 2005).
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result in limiting relief to narrow circumstances. For example, in Illinois,
only prisoners sentenced to death may bring claims based on newly
discovered evidence, and even then only if the evidence "establishes a
substantial basis to believe that the defendant is actually innocent by
clear and convincing evidence. ' '2' Since the time limit for bringing a new
trial motion in Illinois is thirty days after the verdict,'27 a prisoner
convicted of a non-capital crime is not able to challenge his or her
conviction on the basis of a claim of innocence after that time had
passed.
Even if a claim of innocence on the basis of newly discovered
evidence is cognizable in a petition for postconviction relief, strict
procedural requirements for bringing such petitions, in combination with
the time limit for bringing a motion for a new trial, may also render relief
unavailable after a certain amount of time has passed. For example,
while Alaska law recognizes newly discovered evidence as a basis for
postconviction relief, a prisoner may only file only one motion for
postconviction relief, without exception.2s Where a prisoner cannot bring
either a motion for a new trial or a petition for postconviction relief after
a certain period of time, clemency will be the only form of relief left. The
granting of clemency, however, is extremely rare.'29 A prisoner whose
only chance at being exonerated is to seek clemency faces an uphill
battle, both because of the political considerations that make executives
reluctant to grant pardons and because of the lack of checks on an
executive's discretion to refuse relief.'30
When a motion for a new trial or a postconviction petition are no
longer available, even an innocent prisoner has little hope of gaining
freedom. On the whole, states differ dramatically in the availability and
126. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(2) (2OO6).
127. Id. at 5/II6-I(b).
128. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.72.010(4), I2.72.020(a)(6) (2oo6). See generally id. § 12.72.020. Similarly,
in Delaware, a prisoner must apply for postconviction relief within a year of final judgment, regardless
of what the claimed ground for relief is. DEL. R. CRIM. PROc. 61(i)(i). In combination with the sixty
day limit on bringing a motion for a new trial, this strict statute of limitations bars any review of a
conviction after a certain amount of time has passed. DEL. R. CRIM. PROC. 33.
i29. See, e.g., Molly M. Gill, NACDL News: FAMM Seeks Commutation Cases to Spark Sentencing
Reform, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 2007, at 8 (observing that clemency is rarely granted); Adam M.
Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency, I7 J.L. & POLITIcs 669, 671 (2001)
(noting that the granting of clemency "has dramatically declined in the last few decades").
13o. Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims After Herrera v.
Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 514-15 (1998) ("[E]xecutive clemency is vulnerable to the whims of the
political process... [and] 'possesses.. .a lack of guaranteed procedural safeguards and, given the degree
of discretion, a risk of arbitrary denial."' (quoting Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of
Innocence for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 967 (1994)));
Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM.
CuM. L. REV. 121, 145-46 (2005) ("[T]he clemency process poses three major problems: (i) it is
subject to the whims of the political process, (2) it lacks guaranteed procedural safeguards, and (3) its
use is approaching the vanishing point.").
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procedural aspects of postconviction relief. In practice, however, the
effect is the same: an innocent person may well be in no better position
to be released from prison than a guilty one is.
2. The Difficulty of Establishing Exceptions to Procedural Bars
and Entitlement to Relief
Even if a claim of innocence based on the discrediting of a forensic
technique may be a basis for postconviction relief, there is usually a high
standard for establishing entitlement to relief and exceptions to
procedural bars. It may be difficult for prisoners with such claims to
advance them through traditional postconviction remedies. One
potential pitfall is that the discrediting of a forensic technique is not a
traditional form of newly discovered evidence, so that the substantive
and procedural rules which involve a showing of newly discovered
evidence may not be easy to meet. A related problem is that the
discrediting of a forensic technique may nullify evidence used to convict
a person at trial, but does not have the potential to conclusively prove
that person's innocence. Thus, prisoners convicted on the basis of a
discredited forensic testing technique may not be able to make a
sufficient showing of innocence. Finally, because the laws of many
jurisdictions either do not provide for a right to counsel in postconviction
proceedings or do so only after a petition is filed, many prisoners will be
in the position of filing a petition for postconviction relief without the
assistance of counsel. As a result, petitioners with meritorious claims may
not have the chance to present them adequately if at all, much less obtain
relief based upon them.
Characterizing a recently discredited forensic technique as newly
discovered evidence raises the issue of when a technique is sufficiently
discredited to constitute new evidence. Commonwealth v. Fisher,3' a
recent opinion, illustrates this problem. In Fisher, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court considered whether Robert Fisher's contention that
CBLA was not a valid technique was based on "newly discovered
evidence," and thus whether the court could excuse Fisher's failure to
comply with postconviction timeliness requirements.' Under
Pennsylvania law, a prisoner usually must file a postconviction petition
within one year of final judgment.'33 Nevertheless, if "the facts upon
which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could
not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence," the one-year
limit is excused and the prisoner must file the petition "within 6o days
from the date the claim could have been presented."'"
131. 870 A.2d 864 (Pa. 2005).
132. Id. at 869.
133. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b)(i) (2006).
134. Id. § 9545(b)(2).
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Fisher offered two pieces of evidence which he contended
constituted "newly discovered evidence" that he could not have known
about more than sixty days before filing a petition for postconviction
relief: (i) an article published by the National Academies Press
discussing the NRC Report on CBLA,'35 and (2) an affidavit from
William A. Tobin, a retired forensic metallurgist from the FBI
Laboratory, opining that CBLA "was not scientifically reliable and that
there is no meaningful or comprehensive scientific research or study
validating the premises required to support the practice of CBLA."'' 6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that this evidence was not
sufficient to support the waiver of the time limits on postconviction
petitions for two reasons. First, because the article "conclude[d] that
CBLA [was] a reasonably accurate" method, "although... the value and
reliability of CBLA [could] be enhanced further" the article did not
support Fisher's claim that CBLA was "imprecise and flawed."'37 Second,
because Tobin's resume stated that he had published articles about his
position on CBLA since over two years before Fisher filed his petition,
Fisher had not brought his petition within the sixty-day time limit for
newly discovered evidence. 18 Therefore, the court denied Fisher's
petition as untimely.
Fisher illustrates one potential conundrum for prisoners using
currently available avenues to challenge convictions based on a claim of
a forensic testing technique being discredited. On the one hand, evidence
must cast sufficient doubt upon a forensic testing technique in order to
support a claim. Thus, prisoners must wait for scientists to do research
that discredits the technique to a satisfactory degree. On the other hand,
once evidence that does sufficiently discredit the technique becomes
available, a prisoner may have to bring a claim based on that evidence
quickly in order to comply with applicable time limits. Consequently, the
prisoner must negotiate the fine balance between waiting to gather
enough evidence to demonstrate that a forensic technique is unreliable
and risking the possibility that more conclusive research will be done but
will not come to the prisoner's attention.
3. Postconviction Discovery and Presentation of Evidence
Another problem prisoners may face in using current procedures to
challenge their convictions is obtaining the evidence necessary to
establish their claims. Postconviction DNA testing statutes provide a
procedure by which prisoners can obtain testing of biological evidence
associated with their convictions, usually at the state's expense if the
135. Discussed infra Part I.A.
136. Fisher, 870 A.2d at 868.
137. Id. at 870 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Id. at 87 .
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prisoner is indigent. '39 In addition, DNA testing statutes may provide for
access to other relevant evidence, such as the results of previous
testing.'4° In contrast, the rules governing new trial motions and
postconviction procedures are usually silent on the issue of discovery. As
a result, there is no clear mechanism by which prisoners can acquire the
physical evidence used in a particular forensic technique and other
relevant information that may be used to prove their innocence.
Further, even if prisoners can gather the relevant evidence, they may
be handcuffed by the high standards they must meet to show their
innocence. In Texas, for instance, "[e]stablishing a bare claim of
innocence is a Herculean task.. ''4' To establish entitlement to relief, "the
applicant must show 'by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the
evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could
have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence.' This
showing must.., unquestionably establish [the] applicant's innocence.' 42
In addition, the applicant must provide "affirmative evidence" of
innocence, not just raise doubt about his or her guilt.'43
The discrediting of a forensic technique probably cannot be
considered "affirmative evidence" that "unquestionably establishes" a
prisoner's innocence. Even assuming that a forensic technique was shown
to be completely unreliable, it will not provide affirmative evidence of a
prisoner's innocence. For example, if a prisoner showed that CBLA was
not a legitimate technique, it would, at most, establish that a particular
bullet had not necessarily come from a particular box. While this might
remove a critical piece of evidence from the conviction equation, such a
showing would not prove that a prisoner did not commit the crime at
issue. Newly available scientific techniques like DNA testing have the
potential to prove that a particular person did or did not commit a crime.
In contrast, because CBLA cannot be used to match bullets to individual
boxes, it cannot be used to prove that a bullet came from a box of bullets
that was not in a defendant's possession. Thus, a prisoner challenging his
or her conviction in a jurisdiction that requires a strong showing of
innocence probably will not be entitled to relief even if he or she
conclusively shows that a forensic testing technique has insufficient
probative value.
In many cases, even if a prisoner could otherwise establish
exceptions to procedural bars to relief, he or she will not have the help of
counsel in preparing a petition for postconviction relief. Where the
139. See, e.g., I8 U.S.C. § 36oo(a), (c)(3) (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-269(a), (d) (2005).
140. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(d) (2008).
141. Exparte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 53 8 , 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
142. Id. (quoting Exparte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
143. Exparte Franklin, 72 S.W.3 d 671, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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discrediting of a forensic technique is the basis for a claim, it will be
important to obtain scientific research in support of the technique's
discreditation. Without the aid of counsel, a prisoner will be poorly
positioned to marshal the evidence necessary to support a petition and
avoid its summary dismissal. Texas law does not make any provision for
the appointment of counsel to aid indigent, non-capital prisoners in filing
a habeas petition.'" After filing, in order for the petition to proceed, the
judge must find "controverted, previously unresolved facts which are
material to the legality of the applicant's confinement."'45 Even then, the
judge has the discretion to decide whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing' 6 In light of such stringent requirements for establishing a claim
of innocence, a prisoner who files a petition without the aid of counsel
may not be able to highlight the new evidence establishing his or her
innocence and state a claim sufficient to require further consideration.
The need for the aid of counsel is even more pronounced in
jurisdictions which have detailed requirements governing the contents of
postconviction petitions. For example, in Virginia, a prisoner with a
claim of innocence based on newly discovered evidence may file a
petition for a "writ of actual innocence."'47 If newly discovered
"nonbiological evidence" is the basis for the petition, the prisoner must
allege, "categorically, and with specificity," a detailed list of eight facts.' 48
In addition, the "petition [must] contain all relevant allegations of facts
that are known to the petitioner at the time of filing, [must] be
accompanied by all relevant documents, affidavits and test results, and
[must] enumerate and include all relevant previous records, applications,
petitions, appeals and their dispositions.""' Compliance with these
requirements is necessary in order to avoid summary dismissal.50
144. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(a) (Vernon 1989); cf. id. at art. 11.071 § 2.
145. Id. at art. II.O7 § 3(d).
146. Id.
147. See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.2 to 19.2-327.14 (2007).
148. Id. § 19.2-327.Ii(A) ("The petitioner shall allege categorically and with specificity, under
oath, all of the following: (i) the crime for which the petitioner was convicted, and that such conviction
was upon a plea of not guilty; (ii) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted; (iii) an exact description of the previously unknown or unavailable evidence supporting the
allegation of innocence; (iv) that such evidence was previously unknown or unavailable to the
petitioner or his trial attorney of record at the time the conviction became final in the circuit court; (v)
the date the previously unknown or unavailable evidence became known or available to the petitioner,
and the circumstances under which it was discovered; (vi) that the previously unknown or unavailable
evidence is such as could not, by the exercise of diligence, have been discovered or obtained before the
expiration of 21 days following entry of the final order of conviction by the court; (vii) the previously
unknown or unavailable evidence is material and when considered with all of the other evidence in the
current record, will prove that no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; and (viii) the previously unknown or unavailable evidence is not merely cumulative,
corroborative or collateral.").
149. Id. § 19 .2-327.1I(B).
15o. Id. §§ 19 .2-327.II(B), (D).
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However, a petitioner is entitled to counsel only once, and only if, the
petition is not summarily dismissed.'5 ' Furthermore, it is up to the court's
discretion whether to appoint counsel before deciding whether to
summarily dismiss a petition."' Without the aid of counsel, it is much less
likely that a prisoner with a claim of innocence based on a discredited
forensic technique will be able to prepare a petition that complies with
Virginia's strict requirements.
As the foregoing demonstrates, current postconviction remedies are
insufficient to manage the evolution or test the bounds of science in the
courtroom. Absent changes to currently available methods of relief,
innocent people will remain in prison, convicted by unreliable science.
III. A NEW APPROACH
Suggesting reform legislation is by no means an easy task. Before
introducing it, we would like to make several points. First, we aimed the
legislation solely at the postconviction phase. It is not a prophylactic tool
for use before or during trial. Second, we crafted it as a device to manage
the fallout from discredited science, such as the hundreds of cases that
now hang in the balance due to the admission that CBLA is unreliable,
by requiring that the defendant have a claim of actual innocence. Third,
we wrote it so as to accommodate later determinations that another field
of forensic science is no longer reliable.
We also designed the legislation in a way that does not upset current
innocence and forensic science commissions. The legislation does not
require courts or federal and state governments to create ad hoc
commissions to evaluate the problem on a case-by-case basis. At the
macro-level, such bodies are necessary in order to study and prevent
future wrongful convictions and eliminate the continued use of shoddy
science. However, creation of separate commissions to review a backlog
of existing cases involving faulty forensics would be ineffective on the
individual level. If unreliable science has been used, then there needs to
be a direct way for an innocent person to challenge that science and
obtain relief. Keeping an innocent person in limbo while a commission
reviews what could be hundreds of cases would only contribute to the
injustice. Our framework is designed to complement existing innocence
and forensic science commissions, which aim to prevent wrongful
convictions in the future, by providing an avenue of relief for those
already convicted.'53
151. Id. § 19.2-327.II(E).
152. Id.
153. New York has been on the forefront of the movement to establish a Forensic Science




The appended proposal is an effort to correct the shortcomings of
challenges to scientific evidence under current postconviction
procedures. 4 It envisions a motion and gateway to relief separate and
apart from a postconviction or other collateral scheme. A prisoner will
neither run afoul of nor exhaust other state remedies by taking
advantage of this legislation. Central to its features are the right to
counsel, the right to discovery, and requirement of reliable methodology.
Our proposed legislation also dispenses with time restrictions since it
appreciates the fact that science is not static: what is thought to be
reliable today may not be in twenty years. Additionally, it applies to all
levels of forensic evidence, even psychological and medical evidence.
Science has evolved, and the way we approach innocence and wrongful
convictions should evolve as well.
CONCLUSION
Franqois, Duke of Rochefoucauld, wrote: "Innocence does not find
near so much Protection as Guilt."'55 Our criminal justice system spends a
tremendous amount of energy preserving convictions. The notions of
finality, retribution, and deterrence drive this mentality. When a claim of
innocence is raised, the system's built-in roadblocks create an obstacle
course of "unfavorable legal standards, unreceptive courts, faulty
criminal investigation by law enforcement, inadequate [postconviction]
representation.. .and a lack of resources for factual investigation.
DNA statutes that provide for postconviction testing are a good starting
point for redressing the harm that unreliable science has caused, because
DNA has demonstrated that much of the forensic science used in today's
criminal investigations falls far short of what is acceptable. Our proposed
legislation suggests a place for reform, but such reform should not exist
in a vacuum; DNA testing alone cannot eliminate wrongful convictions.
If our criminal justice demands that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, then that same system should demand accurate and reliable
science. Until we acknowledge and make an effort to correct the
shortcomings of science, the conviction of innocents will continue.
154. See infra Appendix I. In drafting our legislation, we reviewed numerous statutes relating to
postconviction DNA testing. See, e.g., i8 U.S.C. § 3600 (2o0o); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1404-05 (West
2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3.853 (2oo8); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4901 (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.O1
(20o7); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01 (Vernon 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2007).
155. THE MORAL MAXIMS AND REFLECTIONS OF THE DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD 121 (2d ed.,
Methuen & Co. 1912), available at http://www.archive.org/stream/moralmaximsrefleoolarouoft.
156. Garrett, supra note so, at 131.
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APPENDIX I
PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING POSTCONVICTION DISCOVERY AND
EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO CHALLENGE UNRELIABLE SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE; RELATED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
(A) PURPOSE. This rule provides procedures for obtaining
postconviction discovery and an evidentiary hearing to challenge
scientific evidence that has been shown to be unreliable after conviction.
(B) CONTENTS OF MOTION. The motion for postconviction discovery
and evidentiary hearing must be made under oath and must include the
following:
(I) a statement of the facts relied upon in support of the motion,
including a description of the scientific evidence that is the subject of the
motion; including, if known, testing that the evidence was subject to, the
present location of the evidence, and how the evidence was originally
obtained;
(2) a statement that the scientific evidence at issue was previously
admitted in the movant's trial and was a significant factor in the movant's
conviction;
(3) a statement that postconviction discovery about the challenged
scientific evidence likely would definitively establish that the movant is
not the person who committed the crime;
(4) a statement that the movant is innocent and a description of how
postconviction discovery and an evidentiary hearing are relevant and
necessary to his or her assertion of innocence;
(5) a statement that the movant was not the perpetrator of the crime,
that identity was a genuinely disputed issue in the case, and why identity
was an issue;
(6) a statement of any other facts relevant to the motion; and
(7) a certification that a copy of the motion has been served on the
prosecuting authority.
(C) PROCEDURE.
(I) A proceeding under this section is commenced by filing a motion
with the court in which the conviction occurred. Upon receipt of the
motion, the clerk of the court shall docket it, promptly bring it to the
attention of the court, and deliver a copy to the prosecuting authority.
The assigned judge need not be the judge who heard the original case.
(2) The court shall review the motion and deny it if it does not state
a claim upon which relief may be based. If the motion is facially
sufficient, the court shall order the prosecuting authority to respond to
the motion within 30 days or such other time as may be ordered by the
court.
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(3) Upon receipt of the response of the prosecuting authority, the
court shall review the response and either order discovery and set the
motion for an evidentiary hearing or dismiss the motion if there are no
issues of material fact that need to be resolved through a hearing.
(4) When granting or dismissing the motion, the court shall make the
following findings:
(a) Whether it has been shown that the challenged scientific
evidence is subject to dispute;
(b) Whether further discovery and an evidentiary hearing would
produce evidence that the challenged scientific evidence is unreliable;
and
(c) Whether there is a reasonable probability that the movant would
have been acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence if the
scientific evidence had been excluded from trial.
(5) In the event that the court orders discovery and a hearing, the
movant is entitled to counsel. Upon making the appropriate finding of
indigence, the court shall appoint counsel to assist the movant.
(6) If the court orders postconviction discovery and an evidentiary
hearing, the cost of any required evidentiary testing related to the
challenged scientific evidence shall be assessed against the movant,
unless the movant is indigent. If the movant is indigent, the state shall
bear the cost of such testing ordered by the court.
(7) The parties and the court will mutually agree to the process,
scope, and schedule for discovery. Such discovery shall include, but is not
limited to, depositions, production of documents and physical evidence,
testing of physical evidence, medical evaluations, and any other
discovery that the court deems necessary and appropriate. Discovery
shall be governed by the applicable discovery rules of criminal
procedure.
(8) If applicable, the court-ordered discovery shall be conducted by a
laboratory mutually agreed upon by the prosecuting authority and the
movant. If the parties cannot agree, the court shall designate the
laboratory, and such laboratory or agency must be certified by the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors or the National
Forensic Science Training Center.
(9) The result of any testing ordered by the court shall be provided
in writing to the court, the movant, and the prosecuting authority.
(D) EVIDENTIARY HEARING PROCEDURES.
(I) If the court determines that a hearing is necessary to assess the
efficacy, reliability, or trustworthiness of the challenged scientific
evidence, such hearing must include the movant's presentation, if
available, of:
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(a) Evidence regarding the scientific method associated with the
scientific evidence, including, but not limited to, whether such evidence is
based upon sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and involves reliable application of the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.
(b) Evidence regarding the accuracy of the method associated with
the scientific evidence.
(c) Evidence regarding any peer reviews, error rates, and proficiency
tests associated with the scientific evidence.
(d) Evidence regarding the scientific evidence's general acceptance
within the relevant scientific community and scientific community at
large.
(e) Any other evidence regarding the efficacy, reliability, or
trustworthiness of the scientific evidence that would be relevant to the
court's determination.
(2) The prosecuting authority will have the opportunity to present
rebuttal evidence as to the factors enumerated in subsection (D)(i)(a)-
(e).
(E) POST-HEARING PROCEDURES.
(I) Findings. If the court determines that the relief obtained under
this section produced new material evidence that raises a reasonable
probability that the movant is innocent, the movant may file a related
motion for a new trial or resentencing, as appropriate. The court shall
establish a reasonable schedule for the applicant to file such a motion
and for the prosecuting authority to respond to the motion. Such motion
shall be titled "Motion for New Trial Based Upon Unreliable Scientific
Evidence," and may only be brought upon findings made under this
statute. This subsection does not supplant the rules regarding any other
motion for a new trial or for resentencing.
(2) Standard for granting motion for new trial or resentencing. The
court shall grant the motion of the movant for a new trial or
resentencing, as appropriate, if the new material evidence related to the
challenged scientific evidence, when considered with all other evidence
in the case, establishes that a new trial would result in an acquittal.
(3) Inconclusive findings. If the court determines that relief is not
appropriate under this section, the court may order further discovery, if
appropriate, or may deny the movant relief without prejudice.
(F) TIME LIMITATIONS. The motion for postconviction discovery and
evidentiary hearing may be filed or considered at any time following the
date that the judgment and sentence in the case become final.
(G) SUCCESSIVE MOTIONS. Nothing in this section shall prevent the
movant from bringing a successive motion if further developments later
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demonstrate the unreliability of the challenged scientific evidence.
(H) REHEARING. The movant may file a motion for rehearing of any
order denying relief within 15 days after service of the order denying
relief. The time for filing an appeal shall be tolled until an order on the
motion for rehearing has been entered.
(I) APPEAL. An appeal may be taken by any adversely affected party
within 3o days from the date the order on the motion is rendered. All
orders denying relief must include a statement that the movant has the
right to appeal within 3o days after the order denying relief is rendered.
(J) OTHER LAWS UNAFFECTED.
(I) Nothing in this section shall preclude a challenge to scientific
evidence under any other state law.
(2) Postconviction/collateral relief. Nothing in this section shall
provide a basis for relief in any state or federal proceeding.
